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I. Introduction
Though the focus of this chapter will be on causal doctrine in Scots law, it is important to begin by stating emphatically that there is nothing peculiar about the Scottish legal system which requires it to use a special test of causation different from that employed in other legal systems, whether common law, civilian or mixed.
Causation is one of those aspects of private law where comparative analysis is readily applicable, and where 'legal transplants' are to be welcomed, especially given that the small size of the Scottish jurisdiction means that litigation suitable for developing causal doctrine occurs relatively infrequently. That does not mean, however, that there is nothing interesting or distinctive to say about the Scottish doctrinal position on causation: on the contrary, as the following discussion attempts to show, there is.
It is also important to add that the discussion which follows is confined to the law of delict, and largely to what may be called causation in fact (or causation simpliciter, if one prefers, though questions of terminology are given a fuller discussion below).
II. The Current Scottish Doctrinal Position on Causation 2
A general assessment of causation in delict cases indicates that Scottish judicial thinking has been largely unaffected by recent academic writing in the field. Scottish courts still conceive of causation in the terms expounded by Hart and Honoré, 1 that is as a unified doctrine comprising the two component elements of factual and legal causation. Factual causation, it is said, tests whether something caused or contributed to an injury, while legal causation tests whether something which qualifies as a factual cause is deemed significant enough to attract liability at law.
In terms of factual causation, courts recognise the basic test as that of sine qua non (or 'but for'), to be applied by asking whether, in the absence of the defender's behaviour, the damage complained of would still have occurred. If it would not, then the defender's behaviour is considered a factual cause of the damage. Such a test identifies causes which were necessary for an injury's occurrence. In addition to this basic test of necessity, there is said to be a second, alternative test, the so-called material contribution test, which asks whether, without being a necessary cause of an injury, a factor nonetheless contributed to the injury. In fact, this alleged second test is really just as a gloss on the sine qua non test, because it simply clarifies that, in order for sine qua non causation to be demonstrated, it is not necessary that the pursuer, P, demonstrate that the defender, D, caused the totality of the harm suffered by P: rather it is sufficient for P to demonstrate that D 'materially contributed' to the harm by having been a 'but for' cause of a not insignificant portion of the totality of the harm.
That courts do in practice recognise material contribution as a gloss on the sine qua non test may be seen from any one of a number of uncomplicated reported cases of divisible injury (those where different elements of the overall harm sustained, or 3 different degrees of its severity, may be separated out)-cases which therefore do not raise difficult questions of indeterminacy or duplicate causation (as to which, see further below) or indivisible injuries. Courts often express the causal enquiry to be undertaken in such simple cases as an investigation of whether the defender's behaviour 'caused or materially contributed' to the outcome, indicating that the identification of either a sole cause or a contributing cause of an injury will be sufficient to establish causation in fact. Such, for instance, was the stipulated enquiry in the recent case of Kerr v Stiell Facilities Ltd, 2 an industrial injury claim in which the pursuer suffered a minor injury at work while moving heavy machinery with some colleagues. The judge in the case, Lord Hodge, expressed the causal enquiry to be 'whether it has been established that the accident caused or materially contributed to the pursuer's long term pain and debility', 3 holding on the facts that the defender's negligence had 'triggered' the chronic pain syndrome from which the pursuer suffered and was thus properly considered as a factual cause of that injury.
It used also to be the case, until One further point about causal terminology is worth making. In Professor Stapleton's most recent writing on causation, she has argued that the term 'involvement' merits use as an umbrella term for explaining the idea of causation as it operates in a legal context. Involvement, as she conceives it, encompasses those factors which are either (1) necessary for; (2) 'duplicately necessary' for (meaning operating as one of a number of causes of an overdetermined outcome); or (3) 'contribute' to an outcome (contribution essentially covering any NESS condition other than one which is a simple sine qua non cause or a duplicately necessary cause).
'Involvement' so defined has the merit of being an accessible term, which might be less productive of causal anxiety in the minds of judges. 
C. A New Test of Causation
Further development of causal doctrine should also be based upon an acceptance that the present reliance by the courts on the 'but for' test, with its material contribution gloss, cannot continue. Given the inability of sine qua non to deal with common causal difficulties, such as duplicate causation, a new and more comprehensive test needs to be adopted by the courts. Such a more comprehensive test has been developed within the academic community, winning wide acceptance as the best alternative to the sine qua non test. The test in question will be familiar to academics (but few practising lawyers) as the NESS test, known in such an acronymic form because of its identification of all factors preceding an outcome which were necessary elements of a set of conditions sufficient for the outcome to occur (the italicised letters combining to form the acronym). This test, while it contains an element of necessity within it, locates that necessity element within a larger consideration of a set of conditions sufficient for an outcome (thus rightly recognising that there can be more than one set of conditions capable of producing, and thus being sufficient for, a specific outcome).
Despite courts and practising lawyers tending to view NESS as very complicated to apply, it is not. Its application can be explained relatively simply as follows:
Assemble a set of all the conditions which preceded an outcome (eg conditions A, B, C, D, E). If you want to see whether one condition-let's say it is A-was a cause of the outcome, remove any conditions from the set which were not required for the outcome to occur, eg if the outcome would still have occurred without D and E, they are removed. At this point a set of conditions (A, B, C) will be left which was minimally sufficient for the outcome to occur, ie all the conditions in the set were required on this occasion to produce the outcome. Removing the condition in question, A, will therefore produce a set of conditions which is no longer sufficient for the outcome to occur. A is thus held to have been a cause of the outcome.
This improves on the sine qua non test because it allows us to identify duplicate causes as each having been a cause of an outcome. So, if two vehicles V1
and V2 each struck a pedestrian crossing the road, killing him, and the medical evidence is that each blow on its own would have been fatal, while application of the sine qua non test results in the bizarre conclusion that neither vehicle caused the accident (because the impact of the other vehicle would have caused the death in any event), the NESS test correctly identifies each vehicle as a cause. The three conditions present in the set which preceded the death of the pedestrian are: (1) the impact of V1,
(2) the impact of V2, and (3) the presence of the pedestrian, P, on the road. If one wants to see if V1 is a cause of P's death, one removes V2 from the list of conditions and one still has a set minimally sufficient for the outcome; however removing V1 means one no longer has such a set, so V1 was a cause of the death. The same result is reached if one separately tests V2 as a possible cause using the NESS test: V2 is also shown to be a cause of the death. NESS also works to allow proper identification of what can be styled 'pre-emptive' causes, such causes being those which, through their supervening operation, prevent another condition which would have resulted in an outcome from achieving that effect. Thus, negligent exposure of an employee to a fatal dose of radiation, which exposure would have resulted in the employee's death several months later, is not identified as a cause of death if the employee is killed by a lightning strike one week later: the lightning strike is identified using NESS as the (pre-emptive) cause of the death. This is so because the set of conditions minimally sufficient for the death of the employee from the radiation exposure are: (1) the radiation exposure, and (2) the employee affected by it. If the employee is no longer in existence (having been killed by lightning), then this set of minimally sufficient conditions cannot exist. This of course is not to say that the employer's conduct cannot be a cause of the pain and suffering caused between the point of exposure to the radiation and death (indeed such conduct can be shown to be such a cause), but so putting matters identifies a different harmful outcome in relation to which causation is being tested: rather than the death of the employee, we are testing for causes of his pain and suffering up to the point of death. What, however, if the counterfactual behaviour of a particular party in the absence of the defender's negligent behaviour seems not to be determinable?
Orthodox principles suggest that, in such a case, an ordinary damages claim by a pursuer for real world harm should not be allowed to succeed (although the case might conceivably be reframed as one of loss of a chance, an alternative solution touched on briefly below). Although there may be a temptation to skate over apparent problems of indeterminacy when drafting pleadings, such a temptation should be 21 Opinion of the Inner House, delivered by Lord Wheatley, at [29] . The pursuer had eventually been unable to proceed with the contemplated transaction. Instead, he was able to sell his interest in the company which he had set up to undertake the transaction for a much higher sum than the settlement he had had to pay in respect of his breach of fiduciary duty, thus resulting in his making a substantial net gain. Arnold, 33 in which a lost opportunity to sell a property for a higher sum was successfully pled.
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iv. The Default Rule in Cases of Indeterminacy
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the problem about the potentially indeterminate human behaviour arising in misrepresentation cases is that the NESS algorithm presupposes that we are able to input a given counterfactual world, but doesn't tell us how to choose between competing, reasonable counterfactual worlds.
Although the NESS test can't help with this problem, the above discussion shows that, on some occasions, potential difficulties might be resolved through the nature of the duty in question or through the assumption that a careful representation was made (rather than some other assumption). However, where such solutions cannot provide an answer, then, approaching the problem as a matter of principle, the rule must be that a pursuer who claims that, absent D's misrepresentation, outcome X would have prevailed should be required to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that it is indeed X which would have prevailed, rather than some other outcome. 34 If P cannot 33 [1996] In applying this rule, and thus in deciding which of these outcomes is proven in any given case of misrepresentation, much will depend on assessing the credibility and reliability of the evidence presented to the court as to who would have done what.
As to this point, it seems that courts view the matrix of facts which they are entitled to 
vi. Conclusion on Cases of Indeterminacy
What may one conclude from the above discussion of the potential problem of the indeterminacy of counterfactual human behaviour? First, it is important to recognise that courts have shown willingness to fashion solutions to some potential problems through, for instance, careful definition of the duty undertaken on the facts of the case, through a general (though not, it has been suggested, invariable) rule that, in misrepresentation cases, a careful representation should be posited rather than some other counterfactual scenario, and through application of lost chance analysis in certain cases. More work needs to be done in analysing and explaining why certain solutions (lost chance claims, for instance) will be available in some cases but not in others. Second, however, it remains clear that those framing pleadings are sometimes not sufficiently aware of the pitfalls which may arise. This lack of awareness may simply be the result of a failure to appreciate the importance of the counterfactual exercise which must be conducted when following through claimed losses to a demonstrable counterfactual outcome. If that is so, then greater willingness to attend to this exercise would benefit pleaders. Not all problems may be resoluble, but some 
IV. Conclusions
There is nothing unique about causal doctrine in Scotland. The problems Scotland faces in developing its understanding about causation in the field of delict are shared by other jurisdictions throughout the world. It has been a little disappointing then that recent international academic debate in this field appears to have penetrated so little in to current judicial thinking. However, ways in which greater academic influence might be brought to bear on judicial thinking have been suggested in this chapter.
Crucially, it has been argued that the superior NESS test ought to be presented to the courts in a simple, practicable and more relevant manner. Academic presentation of the test has perhaps been somewhat complex and seemingly esoteric in the past. This may explain the absence of reference to the test in reported decisions of the courts. In
Scots law at least, there has also been a tendency in recent times to wait for the lead in developing causal doctrine to be shown by the English courts. In a jurisdiction like 
